题目内容
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(c) Risk committee members can be either executive or non-executive.
Required:
(i) Distinguish between executive and non-executive directors. (2 marks)
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(ii) Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of Chen’s risk management committee being
non-executive rather than executive in nature. (7 marks)
met to discuss how the company might respond to a number of problems that have arisen with Product 2. After a
number of incidents in which Product 2 had failed whilst being used by customers, Chen Products had been presented
with compensation claims from customers injured and inconvenienced by the product failure. It was decided that the
risk committee should meet to discuss the options.
When the discussion of Product 2 began, committee chairman Anne Ricardo reminded her colleagues that, apart from
the compensation claims, Product 2 was a highly profitable product.
Chen’s risk management committee comprised four non-executive directors who each had different backgrounds and
areas of expertise. None of them had direct experience of Chen’s industry or products. It was noted that it was
common for them to disagree among themselves as to how risks should be managed and that in some situations,
each member proposed a quite different strategy to manage a given risk. This was the case when they discussed
which risk management strategy to adopt with regard to Product 2.
Required:
(a) Describe the typical roles of a risk management committee. (6 marks)
What can we infer from the passage？
A．The Basle Committee's core principles require the minimum capital adequacy requirements.
B．The Basle Committee encourages banks to operate with capital of the minimum.
C．The Basle Committee helps bank supervisors to reduce the risk of loss.
D．The Basle Committee ensures banks to pursue the stability of the banking industry.
2 The risk committee at Southern Continents Company (SCC) met to discuss a report by its risk manager, Stephanie
Field. The report focused on a number of risks that applied to a chemicals factory recently acquired by SCC in another
country, Southland. She explained that the new risks related to the security of the factory in Southland in respect of
burglary, to the supply of one of the key raw materials that experienced fluctuations in world supply and also an
environmental risk. The environmental risk, Stephanie explained, was to do with the possibility of poisonous
emissions from the Southland factory.
The SCC chief executive, Choo Wang, who chaired the risk committee, said that the Southland factory was important
to him for two reasons. First, he said it was strategically important to the company. Second, it was important because
his own bonuses depended upon it. He said that because he had personally negotiated the purchase of the Southland
factory, the remunerations committee had included a performance bonus on his salary based on the success of the
Southland investment. He told Stephanie that a performance-related bonus was payable when and if the factory
achieved a certain level of output that Choo considered to be ambitious. ‘I don’t get any bonus at all until we reach
a high level of output from the factory,’ he said. ‘So I don’t care what the risks are, we will have to manage them.’
Stephanie explained that one of her main concerns arose because the employees at the factory in Southland were not
aware of the importance of risk management to SCC. She said that the former owner of the factory paid less attention
to risk issues and so the staff were not as aware of risk as Stephanie would like them to be. ‘I would like to get risk
awareness embedded in the culture at the Southland factory,’ she said.
Choo Wang said that he knew from Stephanie’s report what the risks were, but that he wanted somebody to explain
to him what strategies SCC could use to manage the risks.
Required:
(a) Describe four strategies that can be used to manage risk and identify, with reasons, an appropriate strategy
for each of the three risks mentioned in the case. (12 marks)
To remain fully compliant with the Effland corporate governance code, the board established audit, remuneration and nomination committees which were solely populated by independent non-executive directors. However, it did not consider it necessary to create a separate risk committee because the board believed that the remit of the audit committee included all aspects of risk management policy. This explanation was formally submitted to the shareholders at its first general meeting, who agreed with the board’s proposal.
As part of its expansion strategy, the board of Branscombe Co decided it needed to enter overseas markets, and in particular the developing country of Geeland. The reason that Geeland was selected as a suitable market was because it had experienced rapid economic growth and domestic prosperity following the discovery of rich, offshore mineral deposits. Unfortunately, this small island nation has never enjoyed stable democratic government and is notorious for corrupt business practices, with customs officials regularly demanding bribes from both importers and exporters. As a result, Geeland has a poor international credit rating. In order to attract both domestic and foreign inward investment, the government of Geeland operates with very low levels of indirect tax, which has stimulated the island’s tourist industry and led in turn to a significant increase in hotel building.
Following a successful tendering exercise, Branscombe Co was awarded the contract to supply all of the bathroom equipment for a 200-room hotel, currently under construction in a remote area of the island. The total value of the supply contract amounted to Geeland $1,800,000, and it was to be paid in three equal instalments as the bathrooms were delivered to the hotel. The contract assigns responsibility for shipping the goods the 3,000 km from Effland to the island solely with Branscombe Co, and no payment will be made until an agreed volume of goods clears Geeland customs. A further problem is that the Geeland dollar is quite volatile, but recently it has been strengthening against the Effland dollar. As all contract payments are to be made in Geeland currency, Branscombe Co is exposed to foreign exchange risks.
The many contract-related issues amount to significant risks to Branscombe Co requiring effective management if the supply contract is to be a success and contribute to the company’s ambitious growth targets.
Required:
(a) Explain the function and roles of a risk committee within an effective corporate governance framework, and discuss the advantages which a risk committee could add to the governance of Branscombe Co. (10 marks)
(b) Explain the term risk appetite, and assess how the risk appetite of Branscombe Co has influenced both its corporate strategy and the risks it has chosen to bear. (7 marks)
(c) Explain how Branscombe Co could effectively control the strategic and operational risks which arise from the Geeland supply contract. (8 marks)
— ____________
A、Thank you.
B、I'm glad to hear that.
C、I don't think so.
The Risk of NOT meeting project quality objectives:
A . can be minimized through continuous monitoring.
B . considered a long term risk.
C . will be reflected in the "in-service" life of the product or service.
D . B and C
E . All of the above.
A.I am not sure about my future
B.I"m still hesitating to choose
C.You’re bright
D.It’S time that I ran a risk
Section B – TWO questions ONLY to be attempted
Five years ago, George Woof was appointed chief executive offi cer (CEO) of Tomato Bank, one of the largest global banks. Mr Woof had a successful track record in senior management in America and his appointment was considered very fortunate for the company. Analysts rated him as one of the world’s best bankers and the other directors of Tomato Bank looked forward to his appointment and a signifi cant strengthening of the business.
One of the factors needed to secure Mr Woof’s services was his reward package. Prior to his acceptance of the position, Tomato Bank’s remuneration committee (comprised entirely of non-executives) received a letter from Mr Woof saying that because his track record was so strong, they could be assured of many years of sustained growth under his leadership. In discussions concerning his pension, however, he asked for a generous non-performance related pension settlement to be written into his contract so that it would be payable whenever he decided to leave the company (subject to a minimum term of two years) and regardless of his performance as CEO. Such was the euphoria about his appointment that his request was approved. Furthermore in the hasty manner in which Mr Woof’s reward package was agreed, the split of his package between basic and performance-related components was not carefully scrutinised. Everybody on the remuneration committee was so certain that he would bring success to Tomato Bank that the individual details of his reward package were not considered important.
In addition, the remuneration committee received several letters from Tomato Bank’s fi nance director, John Temba, saying, in direct terms, that they should offer Mr Woof ‘whatever he wants’ to ensure that he joins the company and that the balance of benefi ts was not important as long as he joined. Two of the non-executive directors on the remuneration committee were former colleagues of Mr Woof and told the fi nance director they would take his advice and make sure they put a package together that would ensure Mr Woof joined the company.
Once in post, Mr Woof led an excessively aggressive strategy that involved high growth in the loan and mortgage books fi nanced from a range of sources, some of which proved unreliable. In the fi fth year of his appointment, the failure of some of the sources of funds upon which the growth of the bank was based led to severe fi nancing diffi culties at Tomato Bank. Shareholders voted to replace George Woof as CEO. They said he had been reckless in exposing the company to so much risk in growing the loan book without adequately covering it with reliable sources of funds.
When he left, the press reported that despite his failure in the job, he would be leaving with what the newspapers referred to as an ‘obscenely large’ pension. Some shareholders were angry and said that Mr Woof was being ‘rewarded for failure’. When Mr Woof was asked if he might voluntarily forego some of his pension in recognition of his failure in the job, he refused, saying that he was contractually entitled to it and so would be keeping it all.
Required:
(a) Criticise the performance of Tomato Bank’s remuneration committee in agreeing Mr Woof’s reward package. (10 marks)
(b) Describe the components of an appropriately designed executive reward package and explain why a more balanced package of benefi ts should have been used to reward Mr Woof. (10 marks)
(c) Construct an ethical case for Mr Woof to voluntarily accept a reduction in his pension value in recognition of his failure as chief executive of Tomato Bank. (5 marks)
听力原文：M: What margins will the lending bank charge？
W: Margins mainly depend on these factors: evaluation of credit risk, maturity of credit, and the starting point from which onwards the rate of interest shall be firm.
Q: How many factors do margins charged by the lending bank mainly depend on？
(12)
A．Four.
B．Two.
C．Three.
D．Five.
